lation of the Constitution. If such be
not its just interpretation, it must be regarded as a mere enactment of
advice and counsel, which lacks in the very nature of things the force
of positive law and can serve no useful purpose upon the statute books.

There are other causes that deter me from giving this bill the sanction
of my approval. The judgment of the court-martial by which more than
twenty years since General Fitz John Porter was tried and convicted
was pronounced by a tribunal composed of nine general officers of
distinguished character and ability. Its investigation of the charges of
which it found the accused guilty was thorough and conscientious, and
its findings and sentence were in due course of law approved by Abraham
Lincoln, then President of the United States. Its legal competency, its
jurisdiction of the accused and of the subject of the accusation, and
the substantial regularity of all of its proceedings are matters which
have never been brought into question. Its judgment, therefore, is final
and conclusive in its character.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently declared that a
court-martial such as this was is the organism provided by law and
clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of cases.
Its judgments, when approved, rest on the same basis and are surrounded
by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of
other legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest. It
follows, accordingly, that when a lawfully constituted court-martial has
duly declared its findings and its sentence and the same have been duly
approved neither the President nor the Congress has any power to set
them aside. The existence of such power is not openly asserted, nor
perhaps is it necessarily implied, in the provisions of the bill which
is before me, but when its enacting clauses are read in the light of the
recitations of its preamble it will be seen that it seeks in effect the
practical annulment of the findings and the sentence of a competent
court-martial.

A conclusion at variance with these findings has been reached after
investigation by a board consisting of three officers of the Army. This
board was not created in pursuance of any statutory authority and was
powerless to compel the attendance of witnesses or to pronounce a
judgment which could have been lawfully enforced. The officers who
constituted it, in their report to the Secretary