at," I inquired, "is your political constitution? What are the
powers of your rulers; and how, in the absence of public discussion
and popular suffrage, are they practically limited?"

"In theory they are unlimited," he answered; "in practice they are
limited by custom, by caution, and, above all, by the lack of motives
for misrule. The authority of each prince over those under him, from
the Sovereign to the local president or captain, is absolute. But the
Executive leaves ordinary matters of civil or criminal law to the
Courts of Justice. Cases are tried by trained judges; the old
democratic usage of employing untrained juries having been long ago
discarded, as a worse superstition than simple decision by lot. The
lot is right twelve times in two dozen; the jury not oftener than
half-a-dozen times. The judges don't heat or bias their minds by
discussion. They hear all that can be elicited from parties, accuser,
accused, and witnesses, and all that skilled advocates can say. Then
the secretary of the Court draws up a summary of the case, each judge
takes it home to consider, each writes out his judgment, which is read
by the secretary, none but the author knowing whose it is. If the
majority be five to two, judgment is given; if less, the case is tried
again before a higher tribunal of twice as many judges. If no decision
can be reached, the accused is acquitted for the time, or, in a civil
dispute, a compromise is imposed. The rulers cannot, without incurring
such general anger as would be fatal to their power, disregard our
fundamental laws. Gross tyranny to individuals is too dangerous to be
carried far. It is a capital crime for any but the officers of the
Sovereign and of the twelve Regents to possess the fearfully
destructive weapons that brought our last wars to an end. But any man,
driven to desperation, can construct and use similar weapons so easily
that no ruler will drive a man to such revengeful despair. Again, the
tyranny of subordinate officials would be checked by their chief, who
would be angry at being troubled and endangered by misconduct in which
he had no direct interest. And finally, _personal_ malice is not a
strong passion among us; and our manners render it unlikely that a
ruler should come into such collision with any of his subjects as
would engender such a feeling. Of those immediately about him, he can
and does at once get rid as soon as he begins to dislike, and before
he has cause to hate