the
Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The
states more inland and out of the highway of communication should
understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result
will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the
reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not
be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with
them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast will
one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the interior,
and must recognize that their own interests are deeply involved in this
discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate to exchange peace
for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they are not injured, brave
men abandon peace for war when they are injured, returning to an
understanding on a favourable opportunity: in fact, they are neither
intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to take an injury for
the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace. Indeed, to falter for
the sake of such delights is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way
of losing the sweets of repose to which you cling; while to conceive
extravagant pretensions from success in war is to forget how hollow is
the confidence by which you are elated. For if many ill-conceived plans
have succeeded through the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many
more, apparently well laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace. The
confidence with which we form our schemes is never completely justified
in their execution; speculation is carried on in safety, but, when it
comes to action, fear causes failure.
"To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is
under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and
after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have
many reasons to expect success--first, superiority in numbers and in
military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying obedience in
the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall
be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the
moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce
their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of
Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed
to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A
single defeat at sea is in all li
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