troops of the Coalition the French
Revolution opposed soldiers who were badly drilled but who constituted
large masses, the product of the whole nation. Some means had to be
discovered of protecting Paris with these masses. That could not be
done without victory in the open field. A mere musketry engagement
would not suffice, a form would have to be discovered by which the
masses could be utilized and this was found in the column. The column
formation allowed slightly drilled troops to keep better order and by
means of a better marching speed (one hundred steps to the minute)
allowed it to break through the stiff old-fashioned line arrangement.
It was possible by this formation to fight in country unsuitable to
the line formation, to mass troops in places suitable, to associate
scattered sharpshooters with the columns, to keep back, occupy and
wear the lines of the enemy, until the decisive movement came when a
charge could be made by the troops held in reserve. This new method of
combining riflemen and columns and making a complete army corps
consisting of all arms, which was fully developed on its tactical and
strategic side by Napoleon, was only rendered possible by the change
in military material brought about by the French Revolution. There
were still two very important technical preliminaries, first the
making of light carriages for field pieces which were constructed by
Gribevaul by means of which alone the required quick advance was
rendered possible, and making the army rifle a more precise weapon by
adapting to it some of the features of the hunting rifle. Without
these improvements military sharpshooting would have been impossible.

The revolutionary method of arming the entire population was subjected
to certain limitations and chiefly as regards the excusing of the well
to do, and in this form became common to most of the great continental
countries. Prussia alone sought by its militia system to make the
entire force of its people available for military purposes. Prussia
was the first state to provide its entire infantry with the latest
weapons, and to place officers in the rear, since between 1830 and
1860 trained officers leading their troops had played an unimportant
part. The results of 1866 were largely due to these innovations.

In the Franco Prussian War two armies came into contact both of which
had their officers in the rear and which both used substantially the
same tactics as in the time of the