and in the other ten there is no violence,
should the votes of the latter be taken as the net result, or should
no result be declared because half of the voters are prevented from
voting? The practice of a State must be consistent with itself. When
the votes of three-fourths of a State are proffered as the vote of the
State, the votes of three-fourths of a parish must be received as the
vote of the parish. If there was not a "fair and free election" in
one-fourth of the parishes, there was not a "fair and free election"
in the State; and the just result should be, that, instead of
rejecting the votes of those parishes because a portion of the voters
were intimidated, the votes of the _State_ should be rejected
altogether.

But why, let me ask, should lawful votes in any case be rejected,
because other lawful votes might have been given? If they, whose votes
were cast, had prevented other votes from being also cast, that might
be a reason for punishing the former. But if the former were
blameless, where is the justice of punishing them for the faults of
others? Suppose a parish with 10,000 persons entitled to vote, and
divided into ten precincts. Ordinarily only 8,000 will register and
6,000 vote; the vote of the 6,000 being assumed to be an expression of
the will of the 10,000. At a particular election 3,000 persons vote in
five of the precincts. In the other five only 1,000 vote, there being
disturbances on or before the day of election. It is alleged that the
last 1,000 votes should not be counted. Why not? Because, say the
objectors, 2,000 persons did not vote, and it is to be presumed,
first, that they were kept from the polls by fear, and, next, that if
they had voted at all, they would have outvoted the 1,000. Are not
these the merest assumptions? You cannot get the truth without knowing
the motives which kept voters away, and how they would have voted if
they had come. You cannot know either with certainty, without
examining all the voters. And the theory which would lead you to call
them for examination should also lead you to call all who in other
cases have not voted, to ask why they kept away, and how they would
have voted if they had been present. The argument which justifies the
exclusion in case of intimidation would include all cases of absence
and of inquiry into what would have been the result if there had been
no absence. Intimidation is one kind of undue influence; expectation
of benefit is another;