of Royal Commission
on the War in South Africa_, p. 225.)]

[Sidenote: The scheme of mobilisation.]

The scheme for mobilisation had been gradually developed during many
years. The earliest stage was the appearance in the Army List of an
organisation of the army in various army corps. This was chiefly
useful in showing the deficiencies which existed. It had been drawn up
by the late Colonel Home, R.E. In August, 1881, it was removed from
the Army List.

[Sidenote: Various stages of scheme.]

Practically no mobilisation scheme really took shape until 1886, when
Major-General H. Brackenbury,[3] on assuming office as head of the
Intelligence branch, turned his attention to the question. The
unorganised condition of our army and the deficiency of any system for
either home defence or action abroad formed the subjects of three
papers,[4] in which he showed that, at the time they were written, not
even one army corps with its proper proportion of the different
departmental branches, could have been placed in the field, either at
home or abroad, while for a second army corps there would have been
large deficiencies of artillery and engineers, and no departments. For
horses there was no approach to an adequate provision. The urgent
representations contained in these papers were strongly taken up by
Lord Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, and pressed by him on the
Secretary of State for War,[5] with the result that a committee of
two, Sir Ralph Thompson[6] and Major-General H. Brackenbury, was
appointed to investigate the matter.

[Footnote 3: Now General the Right Honourable Sir Henry
Brackenbury, G.C.B.]

[Footnote 4: Mobilisation reports, Numbers I., II. and III.]

[Footnote 5: The Right Honourable W. H. Smith.]

[Footnote 6: Then Permanent Under-Secretary of State.]

[Sidenote: Sub-division to carry out.]

Their enquiry was entirely confined to the question of obtaining the
maximum development from the existing cadres. Their report was divided
under three headings, the first of which dealt with the "Field Army,"
and laid down that two army corps and lines of communication troops
was the field army which the regular troops, as they then stood, were
capable of producing. The subjects of "Garrisons" and "Mobilisation
for Foreign Service" were dealt with under the other two headings.
Ultimately a Mobilisation sub-division, which was transferred from the
Intelligen