n and, with that object in view,
a preliminary reconnaissance was made. This, however, revealed that the
enemy had so placed his machine guns as to sweep the whole of the area
concerned. It was, therefore, decided to abandon the idea, as the
probable losses would be quite out of proportion to the benefit to be
gained.
The policy of the Anzac Corps, as given out at this time, was, in view
of the strength of the defences, to invite the Turk to attack. It was
anticipated that the losses inflicted on him would be so heavy that he
would be compelled to remain quiescent for the whole of the winter.
During that period the Australians would be able to hold their ground
with a greatly reduced garrison; thus simplifying the question of supply
and enabling the surplus troops to be sent away for rest and refit. On
the 22nd November, a Divisional Order was received directing that as
little firing as possible should take place and that no offensive on our
part was to be attempted. A further Order laid down that from 6 p.m. on
the 24th the Australians should not only hold their fire, but should
also refrain from displaying periscopes above the parapets. Proceeding,
it stipulated that the enemy was to be allowed to show himself, but this
latter provision subsequently gave way to an imperative injunction that
no opportunity of killing a Turk was to be missed.
This period of inactivity was continued until midnight on the 27th
November, and was facetiously termed the "close season for Turkey." In
the early portion, the unusual quietness on our side had a weird effect.
The enemy continued his ordinary activity for a time and then audibly
slackened, only to resume again later on. At night time he sent over
patrols to investigate, but these were not allowed to return. A story
was told of a solitary individual crossing over from the opposite lines
and quietly removing some filled sandbags from our parapet in order to
repair his own. The Turk was very short of this useful article and his
trenches always presented a spectacle of many materials and colours.
The ruse having failed in its expressed purpose, the normal defensive
was resumed.
On the 24th November, the 25th Battalion, then in Reserve Gully, was
ordered to be in readiness to embark for Lemnos Island for a rest. The
following day the 27th Battalion, at Mule Gully, received a similar
order. Both these orders were subsequently countermanded--much to the
disgust of the units conce
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