asily man[oe]uvrable Fokker, with its machine-gun
synchronizing gear for firing through the propeller, gave the Germans a
temporary lead, but by the Battle of the Somme this was outclassed and
in 1916 our air superiority became marked. The Royal Flying Corps was by
that time organized into Brigades and Wings, one Wing operating with
each Army for fighting and distant reconnaissance, and one Wing with
each Corps for short reconnaissance and such specialized work as
artillery co-operation and contact patrols. Both types of machine took
part in bombing operations.

There is generally perhaps a tendency, when reviewing the army and air
effort in the war, to deal almost entirely with the Western Front and to
forget the prodigious work done in many other theatres.

In 1915 the Royal Naval Air Service carried out all air work with the
Army and Navy in the Gallipoli campaign and showed how a single air
force could effect really important co-operation with both services. In
addition to the normal duties of co-operation with the Army and the
Fleet, and in spite of the difficulties of transport, supply and
workshop arrangements, photographs were taken from the air of the
greater part of the Peninsula, and the original inaccurate maps
corrected therefrom; frequent bombing raids were carried out against
objectives on the Peninsula, the Turkish lines of communications, and
even Constantinople itself. In this campaign, too, torpedoes were used
for the first time by aircraft and three ships were destroyed in the
Dardanelles by this means. The distance from the hub of affairs, a line
of supply about 6,000 miles in length, sickness and the climatic and
geographical conditions rendered maintenance very difficult. Sand and
dust driven in clouds by high winds greatly shortened the working life
of engines. The heat during the summer caused the rapid deterioration of
machines, while long oversea flights entailed loss from forced landings.
There are many aspects of the deepest interest to be brought out when a
complete history of the Campaign in Gallipoli comes to be written. It is
true that the Allies would have lost all if they had been defeated in
the west, and that the call of the Armies for more and more men and
munitions for that theatre was insistent; it is equally true, however,
that in France there could be nothing but batter and counter-batter, and
the only remaining point where strategic principles could be brought to
bear was at t