hat instrument, that we have to deal with.

They avoided the use of the word slave. They incorporated the words
"person held to service or labor." They admitted the claim to service or
labor: none other: a claim (regarded in its constitutional aspect) in the
nature of what the law calls a _chose in action_,--or, in other words, a
thing to which, though it cannot be strictly said to be in actual
possession, one has a right.

In common parlance we employ words, in connection with Slavery, which
imply much more than such a claim. We say slave-holder and slave-owner; we
speak of the institution of Slavery: but we do not say apprentice-holder
or apprentice-owner; nor do we speak of the institution of Apprenticeship.
The reason, whether valid or invalid, for such variance of phraseology in
speaking of the two classes of claims, is not to be found in any
admission, express or implied, in the provision of the Constitution now
under consideration. In it the framers of that instrument employed one and
the same phrase to designate the master of the apprentice and the master
of the slave. Both are termed "the party to whom service or labor may be
due."

Is there any other clause in the Constitution in which a distinction is
made between the apprentice and the slave? There is one, and only one. In
determining the number of inhabitants in each State as a basis of
representation and taxation, it is provided that the whole number of
apprentices shall be included, while three-fifths only of the slaves are
to be taken into account. But the wording of this clause is especially
noteworthy. It reads thus:--

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union according
to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding
to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to
service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three-fifths of all other persons."

To avoid mistakes, it was deemed necessary to include apprentices by
express specification. Why this? Every one would have felt it to be
absurd, if the words had been, "the whole number of free persons,
including farm-laborers." But why absurd? Because persons engaged in free
labor are, beyond question, free persons. Not so those "bound to service."
While so bound, apprentices may be considered not free; when the "term of
years," and with it the bondage to se