ation of war, while the Boers' military
operations were somehow successful he wrote to Mr. Piet de Wet also a
member of the Cape Parliament--"it is hopeless...."

"If the Republics had not made the fatal mistake of sending the
ultimatum when they did, things would have gone differently; but it
is of no use going back on what might have been."

His letter had no effect upon Mr. de Wet, who now is under trial for
high treason along with three other Members of the House.

There are other letters, among them one written by Mr. Te Water, who
left the Schreiner Ministry. In a speech delivered at Graaff-Reinet some
time ago he has declared that the Cape Government ought not to have
allowed the railway lines to be used by English troops. Yet in a letter
to President Steyn on the 8th of May, 1899, he asked him to put pressure
upon "our friends in Pretoria" to adopt conciliatory measures. Alluding
to the impending Conference he writes:--

"In your position you as go-between can do endless good towards
arriving at an understanding at such Conference. I know well that
there is a party who will do everything possible to prevent this."

Nevertheless he also is in favour of the policy advocated by Mr. Melius
de Villiers:--

"We must now play to win time. Governments are not perpetual. It is
honestly now the time to yield a little, however one may later
again tighten the rope."

This shows how this former Minister at the Cape meant to abide by
Conventions. How Mr. Krueger did abide by the Conventions of 1881 and
1884 is a well-known fact. No wonder if England was suspicious of the
"ridiculous proposals," to use Mr. de Villiers' phrase, offered by
President Krueger. The letters written by Mr. Te Water and Mr. Melius de
Villiers show that there was good reason for suspicion. These letters
show also what responsibility has been assumed by the members of the
Liberal party who sided so eagerly with Mr. Krueger and by those who,
like Mr. Stead, backed at first Mr. Rhodes' policy with all their might
(so Mr. Clark wrote to General Joubert, Mr. Krueger, and President
Steyn) and were blind enough to imagine that their party was strong
enough to elbow out the Government and revert to Mr. Gladstone's policy
after Majuba. Had they been more far-sighted they would have recognised
that the Transvaal had since 1881 condemned itself, and that no
Ministry, be it Liberal or Conservative, could follow a