mendous artillery duel d'Erlon's men had been
formed up for that massed attack for which the Emperor was famous, and
with which it was expected the English line would be pierced and the
issue decided. The Emperor, as has been noted, had intended the attack
on Hougomont as a mere feint, hoping to induce the Duke of Wellington
to reinforce his threatened right and thereby to weaken his left
center. It was no part of the Emperor's plan that an attempt to
capture Hougomont should become the main battle on his own left that it
had, nor could he be sure that even the tremendous attack upon it had
produced the effect at which he aimed. Nevertheless, the movement of
d'Erlon had to be tried.

It must be remembered that Napoleon had never passed through the
intermediate army grades. He had been jumped from a regimental officer
to a General. He had never handled a regiment, a brigade, a division,
a corps--only an army, or armies. Perhaps that was one reason why he
was accustomed to leaving details and the execution of his plans to
subordinates. He was the greatest of strategists and the ablest of
tacticians, but minor tactics did not interest him, and the arrangement
of this great assault he left to the corps and its commander.

Giving orders to Ney and d'Erlon, therefore, the Emperor at last
launched his grand attack. One hundred and twenty guns were
concentrated on that part of the English left beyond the westernmost of
the two outlying positions, through which it was determined to force a
way. Under cover of the smoke, which all day hung thick and heavy in
the valley and clung to the ridges, d'Erlon's splendid corps, which had
been so wasted between Quatre Bras and Ligny, and which was burning to
achieve something, was formed in four huge parallel close-ranked
columns, slightly echeloned under Donzelot, Marcognet, Durutte and
Allix. With greatly mistaken judgment, these four columns were crowded
close together. The disposition was a very bad one. In the first
place, their freedom of movement was so impaired by lack of proper
distance as to render deployment almost impossible. Unless the columns
could preserve their solid formation until the very point of contact,
the charge would be a fruitless one. In the second place, they made an
enormous target impossible to miss. The attack was supported by light
batteries of artillery and the cavalry in the flanks.

Other things being equal, the quality of soldiers being