dy and disbursement of the public money seems to be
unavoidable; and before it can be admitted that the influence and power
of the Executive would be increased by dispensing with the agency of
banks the nature of that intervention in such an agency must be
carefully regarded, and a comparison must be instituted between its
extent in the two cases.

The revenue can only be collected by officers appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The public moneys in the
first instance must therefore in all cases pass through hands selected
by the Executive. Other officers appointed in the same way, or, as in
some cases, by the President alone, must also be intrusted with them
when drawn for the purpose of disbursement. It is thus seen that even
when banks are employed the public funds must twice pass through the
hands of executive officers. Besides this, the head of the Treasury
Department, who also holds office at the pleasure of the President, and
some other officers of the same Department, must necessarily be invested
with more or less power in the selection, continuance, and supervision
of the banks that may be employed. The question is then narrowed to the
single point whether in the intermediate stage between the collection
and disbursement of the public money the agency of banks is necessary
to avoid a dangerous extension of the patronage and influence of the
Executive. But is it clear that the connection of the Executive with
powerful moneyed institutions, capable of ministering to the interests
of men in points where they are most accessible to corruption, is less
liable to abuse than his constitutional agency in the appointment and
control of the few public officers required by the proposed plan? Will
the public money when in their hands be necessarily exposed to any
improper interference on the part of the Executive? May it not be hoped
that a prudent fear of public jealousy and disapprobation in a matter so
peculiarly exposed to them will deter him from any such interference,
even if higher motives be found inoperative? May not Congress so
regulate by law the duty of those officers and subject it to such
supervision and publicity as to prevent the possibility of any serious
abuse on the part of the Executive? And is there equal room for such
supervision and publicity in a connection with banks, acting under the
shield of corporate immunities and conducted by persons irresponsible
to the Gove