n of a thing is the _first cause_ relatively to that thing; it
is the substance of that thing untrammelled, by any antecedent conditions.

If we realize that all visible things _must_ have their origin in spirit,
then the whole creation around us is the standing evidence that the
starting-point of all things is in thought-images or ideas, for no other
action than the formation of such images can be conceived of spirit prior
to its manifestation in matter. If, then, this is spirit's modus operandi
for self-expression, we have only to transfer this conception from the
scale of cosmic spirit working on the plane of the universal to that of
individualized spirit working on the plane of the particular, to see that
the formation of an ideal image by means of our thought is setting first
cause in motion with regard to this specific object. There is no difference
in kind between the operation of first cause in the universal and in the
particular, the difference is only a difference of scale, but the power
itself is identical. We must therefore always be very clear as to whether
we are _consciously_ using first cause or not. Note the word "consciously"
because, whether consciously or unconsciously, we are always using first
cause; and it was for this reason I emphasized the fact that the Universal
Mind is purely subjective and therefore bound by the laws which apply to
subjective mind on whatever scale. Hence we are _always_ impressing some
sort of ideas upon it, whether we are aware of the fact or not, and all our
existing limitations result from our having habitually impressed upon it
that idea of limitation which we have imbibed by restricting all
possibility to the region of secondary causes. But now when investigation
has shown us that conditions are never causes in _themselves_, but only the
subsequent links of a chain started on the plane of the pure ideal, what we
have to do is to reverse our method of thinking and regard the ideal as the
real, and the outward manifestation as a mere reflection which must change
with every change of the object which casts it. For these reasons it is
essential to know whether we are consciously making use of first cause with
a definite purpose or not, and the criterion is this. If we regard the
fulfilment of our purpose as contingent upon any _circumstances_, past,
present, or future, we are not making use of first cause; we have descended
to the level of secondary causation, which is the re