he had acted rightly.

The other case, for obvious reasons, must be mentioned as briefly as
possible. On August 7, 1889, Mrs. Maybrick was convicted of the murder
of her husband. The sentence was afterwards commuted with Fitzjames's
approval, and, I believe, at his suggestion, to penal servitude for
life, upon the ground, as publicly stated, that although there was no
doubt that she had administered poison, it was possible that her husband
had died from other causes. A great deal of feeling was aroused:
Fitzjames was bitterly attacked in the press, and received many
anonymous letters full of the vilest abuse. Hatred of women generally,
and jealousy of the counsel for the defence were among the causes of his
infamous conduct suggested by these judicious correspondents. I, of
course, have nothing to say upon these points, nor would I say anything
which would have any bearing upon the correctness of the verdict. But as
attacks were made in public organs upon his behaviour as judge, I think
it right to say that they were absolutely without foundation. His
letters show that he felt the responsibility deeply; and that he kept
his mind open till the last. From other evidence I have not the least
doubt that his humanity and impartiality were as conspicuous in this as
in other cases, and I believe were not impugned by any competent
witnesses, even by those who might doubt the correctness of the
verdict.

Fitzjames's powers were such as naturally gave him unsurpassed authority
with juries in criminal cases. A distinguished advocate was about to
defend a prisoner upon two similar counts before Fitzjames and another
eminent judge. The man was really guilty: but, said the counsel, and his
prediction was verified, I shall obtain a verdict of 'not guilty' before
the other judge, but not before Stephen. In civil cases, I am told that
an impartial estimate of his merits would require more qualification.
The aversion to technicality and over-subtlety, to which I have so often
referred, appears to have limited his powers. He did not enjoy for its
own sake the process of finding a clue through a labyrinth of refined
distinctions, and would have preferred a short cut to what seemed to him
the substantial merits of the case. He might, for example, regard with
some impatience the necessity of interpreting the precise meaning of
some clause in a legal document which had been signed by the parties
concerned as a matter of routine, without thei