se to them. He estimates them. So they view the matter. Is
not such a conception a vitally important spring of action for those
who possess it?

These illustrations suggest that one ill appreciates the insight of
reason, even as so imperfectly and one-sidedly sketched by me at the
last lecture, who does not see that this insight has an extremely
close connection with the will.

IV

Our illustrations have now prepared the way for a general review of
the relations between our reason and our will. We are ready at length
to ask whether any insight of reason, whether any general view of the
nature and of the unity of the world or of life, {136} could possibly
be a merely theoretical insight. And if we rightly answer this
question, we shall be prepared to reply to the objection that,
according to the doctrine of the last lecture, the divine insight
which overarches our ignorance, and which has all reality for its
object, is a lifeless, or an unpractical, or a merely remote type of
pure knowledge.

Our attempt to deal with this new question can best be made by taking
a direct advantage of what some of you may suppose to be the most
formidable of all objections to the whole argument of the last
lecture. In my sketch of a philosophy of the reason, I have so far
deliberately avoided mentioning what many of you will have had in mind
as you have listened to me, namely, that doctrine about our knowledge,
and about truth, and about our mode of access to truth, which to-day
goes by the name of Pragmatism. Here we have to do, once more, with
some of the favourite theses of James's later years. We have also to
do with a view with which my present audience is likely to be
familiar, at least so far as concerns both the name pragmatism and the
best-known fundamental theses of the pragmatist. For I speak in the
immediate neighbourhood of one of the most famous strongholds of the
recent pragmatic movement. I can give but a comparatively small
portion of our limited time to the task of explaining to you how I
view those aspects of pragmatism which here concern our enterprise.
Yet this summary discussion will go far, I hope, to show how {137} I
view the relations between the reason and the will, and in how far our
will also seems to me to be a source of religious insight.

That human knowledge is confined to the range furnished by human
experience, and cannot be used to transcend that experience, is an
opi