Genlis
and "Pamela." Maret's own words to Miles are decisive on this point: "I
was not a secret agent; I had no authority to treat, nor had I any
mission; and in declaring this to Mr. Pitt and to you I said nothing but
the truth."[129] With characteristic mendacity Lebrun afterwards
informed the Convention that Maret was a secret agent and that Pitt had
requested an interview with him. The interview came about owing to the
exertions of William Smith, M.P., a well-intentioned Whig, who hoped
much from an informal conversation between Pitt and one of the head
clerks of the French Foreign Office. Chauvelin viewed it with jealousy,
it being his aim to represent Maret as an emissary to the British and
Irish malcontents.[130] Pitt, when he granted the interview, cannot have
known of this, or of the design of Lebrun ultimately to foist Maret into
the place of Morgues at the French Embassy. Accordingly he welcomed
Maret cordially. No tactical skirmish about chairs took place, and Maret
afterwards declared that the great Minister behaved affably throughout,
brightening his converse at times by a smile. As the personality of the
two statesmen and the gravity of the crisis invest this interview with
unique interest, Pitt's account of it, which is in the Pretyman MSS.,
must be given almost in full.

He [Maret] expressed his regret at the distant and suspicious
terms on which England and France appeared to stand, his
readiness to give me any _eclaircissement_ he could, and his
belief that the present French Government would be very glad if
means could be found by private agents, with no official
character, to set on foot a friendly explanation.

I told him that, if they were desirous of such an explanation,
it seemed to me much to be wished under the critical
circumstances; as we might by conversing freely learn whether it
was possible to avoid those extremities which we should very
much regret but which seemed from what we saw of the conduct and
designs of France to be fast approaching; and I then mentioned
to him distinctly that the resolution announced respecting the
Scheldt was considered as proof of an intention to proceed to a
rupture with Holland; that a rupture with Holland on this ground
or any other injurious to their rights, must also lead to an
immediate rupture with this country; and that altho' we should
deeply regret the event and were really d