timate end to be pursued, after the troop
had penetrated so far into the interior as Marlborough. Had he
pushed on at once, it is barely possible that Washington might
have fallen at a less expense of human life than actually
occurred. Perhaps, too, he commenced she attack at Bladensburg
with a degree of precipitancy which hindered him from, taking
advantage of an open ford, and compelled him to expose his troops
to the fire of the enemy's artillery whilst crossing a narrow
bridge in a single column. But these errors, if errors they may
be termed, were amply compensated by the perfect success of his
operations; whilst in every other particular his conduct was
beyond the reach of censure. In his choice of ground for
halting, in the order both of his advance and retreat, and in
the rapidity of his movements as soon as his plans had been
arranged, General Ross exhibited himself in the light of an able
and diligent commander. No man could possess, more than he a
soldier's eye in examining the face of a country; and in what
little manoeuvring the circumstances permitted, he displayed the
proficiency of one well practised in the arts of campaigning. It
will be recollected, that on the 23rd, the day previous to the
battle, we fell in with a strong body of the enemy, to deceive
whom we wheeled off from the main road, and took the direction of
Alexandria. The plan was attended by the most perfect success;
the party deceived, being in fact the advanced guard of the main
army. Thinking that Alexandria, and not Washington, was
threatened, the American General abandoned a strong position,
which he had seized on the main road, harassed his troops by
a needless march towards that town; and discovered his mistake
only time enough to occupy the heights of Bladensburg a very few
minutes before we came in sight.

With respect to the Americans, again, criticism necessarily
degenerates into unqualified censure. From the beginning to the
end of the affair, they acted in no one instance like prudent or
sagacious men. In the first place, they ought on no account to
have risked a general action in an open country, however strong
and steep; and, secondly, they deserved to suffer much more
severely than they did suffer, for permitting an enemy's army to
penetrate beyond Nottingham. In allowing us to land without
opposition, they were perhaps guilty of no great mistake; but
having done so, instead of concentrating their forces in one