nder the idea of national character, or
national interest, to regulate even our weights and measures, and have
prohibited all possibility of emitting paper money, and passing
insolvent laws, &c., it must appear still more extraordinary, that we
should prohibit the government from interfering with both slave trade,
than which nothing could so materially affect both our national honor
and interest.

These reasons influenced me, both on the committee and in convention,
most decidedly to oppose and vote against the clause, as it now makes
part of the system.

You will perceive, sir, not only that the general government is
prohibited from interfering in the slave trade before the year
eighteen hundred and eight, but that there is no provision in the
Constitution that it shall afterwards be prohibited, nor any security
that such prohibition will ever take place; and I think there is great
reason to believe, that, if the importation of slaves is permitted
until the year eighteen hundred and eight, it will not be prohibited
afterwards. At this time, we do not generally hold this commerce in so
great abhorrence as we have done. When our liberties were at stake, we
warmly felt for the common rights of men. The danger being thought to
be past, which threatened ourselves, we are daily growing more
insensible to those rights. In those States which have restrained or
prohibited the importation of slaves, it is only done by legislative
acts, which may be repealed. When those States find that they must, in
their national character and connexion, suffer in the disgrace, and
share in the inconveniences attendant upon that detestable and
iniquitous traffic, they may be desirous also to share in the benefits
arising from it; and the odium attending it will be greatly effaced by
the sanction which is given to it in the general government.

By the next paragraph, the general government is to have a power of
suspending the _habeas corpus act_, in cases of _rebellion_ or
_invasion_.

As the State governments have a power of suspending the habeas corpus
act in those cases, it was said, there could be no reason for giving
such a power to the general government; since, whenever the State
which is invaded, or in which an insurrection takes place, finds its
safety requires it, it will make use of that power. And it was urged,
that if we gave this power to the general government, it would be an
engine of oppression in its hands; since whenever