he United States. I think I can lay it
down as a correct principle, that the common law of England, as it was
at the time of the Declaration of Independence, still continues to be
the national law of this country, so far as it is applicable to our
present state, and subject to the modifications it has received here in
the course of nearly half a century." Chief Justice Taylor of North
Carolina, in his decision in the case of the State _vs._ Reed, in 1823,
Hawkes' N.C. Reps. 454, says, "a law of _paramount, obligation to the
statute_, was violated by the offence--COMMON LAW, founded upon the law
of nature, and confirmed by revelation." The legislation of the United
States abounds in recognitions of the principles of the common law,
asserting their paramount binding power. Sparing details, of which our
national state papers are full, we illustrate by a single instance. It
was made a condition of the admission of Louisiana into the Union, that
the right of trial by jury should be secured to all her citizens,--the
United States government thus employing its power to enlarge the
jurisdiction of the common law in this its great representative.

Having shown that the abolition of slavery is within the competency of
the law-making power, when unrestricted by constitutional provisions,
and that the legislation of Congress over the District is thus
unrestricted, its power to abolish slavery there is established. We
argue it further, from the fact that,

10. SLAVERY NOW EXISTS IN THE DISTRICT BY AN ACT OF CONGRESS. In the act
of 16th July, 1790, Congress accepted portions of territory offered by
the states of Maryland and Virginia, and enacted that the laws, as they
then were, should continue in force, "until Congress shall otherwise by
law provide." Under these laws, adopted by Congress, and in effect
re-enacted and made laws of the District, the slaves there are now held.

Is Congress so impotent in its own "exclusive jurisdiction" that it
cannot "otherwise by law provide?" If it can say, what _shall_ be
considered property, it can say what shall _not_ be considered property.
Suppose a legislature should enact that marriage contracts should be
mere bills of sale, making a husband the proprietor of his wife, as his
_bona fide_ property; and suppose husbands should herd their wives in
droves for the market as beasts of burden, or for the brothel as victims
of lust, and then prate about their inviolable legal property, and deny
t