slope, across the dyke, the Covenanters were drawn up; and the
practised eye of Claverhouse saw at a glance that they had gathered
there not to pray but to fight. "When we came in sight of them," he
wrote to Linlithgow, "we found them drawn up in battle upon a most
advantageous ground, to which there was no coming but through mosses and
lakes. They were not preaching, and had got away all their women and
children."[24] They were ranged in three lines: those who had firearms
being placed nearest to the dyke, behind them a body of pikemen, and in
the rear the rest, armed with scythes set on poles, pitchforks, goads
and other such rustic weapons. On either flank was a small body of
mounted men. Hamilton was in command: Burley had charge of the horse;
and among others present that day was William Cleland, then but sixteen
years old, and destined ten years later to win a nobler title to fame by
a glorious death at the head of his Cameronians in the memorable defence
of Dunkeld.
As usual, it is impossible to estimate with any exactness the strength
of either side. According to one of their own party, who was present,
the Covenanters did not exceed two hundred and fifty fighting men, of
whom fifty were mounted and the same proportion armed with guns. These
numbers have been accepted, of course, by Wodrow, and also by Dr.
Burton. But within a week this handful had, on Hamilton's own testimony,
grown to six thousand horse and foot; and though, no doubt, the success
at Drumclog would have materially swelled the Covenanting ranks, if they
were only two hundred and fifty on that day, the most liberal
calculation can hardly accept the numbers said to have been gathered on
Glasgow Moor six days later. Probably, if we increase the former total
and diminish the latter, we shall get nearer the mark; but it is
impossible to do more than conjecture. Sharpe, in the fragment printed
by Napier, rates Hamilton's force at six hundred. Claverhouse's own
estimate was "four battalions of foot, and all well armed with fusils
and pitchforks, and three squadrons of horse." His experience was more
likely to serve him in such matters than the untrained calculations of
men who were, moreover, naturally concerned to magnify the defeat of the
King's troops as much as possible; while it is clear from the tone of
his own despatch, which is singularly literal and straightforward, that
he had no wish, and did not even conceive it necessary, to excuse his
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