ery dawn of his power.
It was, indeed, the light from the East which fast enabled him to see his
greatness in perspective; and that light never ceased to fix his
attention and dazzle his imagination. I know well that Gardanne's
embassy was at first conceived on a much grander scale than that on which
it was executed. Napoleon had resolved to send to the Shah of Persia
4000 infantry, commanded by chosen and experienced officers, 10,000
muskets, and 50 pieces, of cannon; and I also know that orders were given
for the execution of this design. The avowed object of the Emperor was
to enable the Shah of Persia to make an important diversion, with 80,000
men, in, the eastern provinces of Russia. But there was likewise
another, an old and constant object, which was always, uppermost in
Napoleon's mind, namely the wish to strike at England in the very heart
of her Asiatic possessions. Such was the principal motive of Gardanne's
mission, but circumstances did not permit the Emperor, to, give, it, all
the importance he desired. He contented himself with sending a few
officers of engineers and artillery, to Persia, who, on their arrival,
were astonished at the number of English they found there.

CHAPTER XI.

1807

Abuse of military power--Defence of diplomatic rights--Marshal Brune
--Army supplies--English cloth and leather--Arrest on a charge of
libel--Dispatch from M. Talleyrand--A page of Napoleon's glory--
Interview between the two Emperors at Tilsit,--Silesia restored to
the Queen of Prussia--Unfortunate situation in Prussia--
Impossibility of reestablishing Poland in 1807--Foundation of the
Kingdom of Westphalia--The Duchy of Warsaw and the King of Saxony.

Meanwhile the internal affairs of the towns over which my diplomatic
jurisdiction extended soon gave me more employment than ever. The
greatest misfortune of the Empire was, perhaps, the abuse of the right
arrogated by the wearers of epaulettes. My situation gave me an
opportunity of observing all the odious character of a military
government. Another in my place could not have done all that I did. I
say this confidently, for my situation was a distinct and independent
one, as Bonaparte had told me: Being authorised to correspond directly
with the Emperor; the military chiefs feared, if they did not yield to my
just representations, that I would made private reports; this
apprehension was wonderfully useful in enabling me to maintain the ri