difficulties. Sooner or later he must take a wife who will bear him a
child; for as long as he has no direct heir there is every chance that
his death will be the signal for a Revolution. His brothers are
perfectly incapable of filling his place, and a new party would rise up
in favour of the Bourbons; which must be prevented above all things. At
present they are not dangerous, though they still have active and devoted
agents. Altona is full of them, and you will be surrounded by them.
I beg of you to keep a watchful eye upon them, and render me a strict
account of all their movements, and even of their most trivial actions.
As they have recourse to all sorts of disguises, you cannot be too
vigilant; therefore it will be advisable, in the first place, to
establish a good system of espionage; but have a care of the spies who
serve both sides, for they swarm in Germany."

This is all I recollect of my conversations with Fouche at Pont-Carre.
I returned to Paris to make preparations for my journey to Hamburg.

CHAPTER XXXII.

1805.

Capitulation of Sublingen--Preparations for war--Utility of
commercial information--My instructions--Inspection of the emigrants
and the journals--A pamphlet by Kotzebue--Offers from the Emperor of
Russia to Moreau--Portrait of Gustavus Adolphus by one of his
ministers--Fouche's denunciations--Duels at Hamburg--M. de Gimel
--The Hamburg Correspondent--Letter from Bernadotte.

I left Paris on the 20th of May 1805. On the 5th of June following I
delivered my credentials to the Senate of Hamburg, which was represented
by the Syndic Doormann and the Senator Schutte. M. Reinhart, my
predecessor, left Hamburg on the 12th of June.

The reigning Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick, to whom I had
announced my arrival as accredited Minister to them, wrote me letters
recognising me in that character. General Walmoden had just signed the
capitulation of Sublingen with Marshal Mortier, who had the command in
Hanover. The English Government refused to ratify this, because it
stipulated that the troops should be prisoners of war. Bonaparte had two
motives for relaxing this hard condition. He wished to keep Hanover as a
compensation for Malta, and to assure the means of embarrassing and
attacking Prussia, which he now began to distrust. By advancing upon
Prussia he would secure his left, so that when convenient he might march
northward. Mortier, therefore, received orders