t-watch. To his
surprise and annoyance the animal would not permit him to enter, and
attacked him every time he tried to climb in. The animal knew him well,
responded to his attempts to fondle it, but the moment he made an
attempt to enter the window it became hostile and seemed ready to spring
upon him. In its small brain was the feeling that no one, master or
stranger, had the right to enter that house at night by the window, and
it was there to perform its duty without regard to persons. In the end,
the gentleman was obliged to leave and seek shelter elsewhere.

The development of the sense of duty and the growth of moral
restriction in primitive man were probably very slow, much more so than
the evolution of intelligence. The social habit of man doubtless
rendered necessary, at an early period, some restraints on the actions
of individuals, and these in time gained the strength of unwritten law;
but many of them were scarcely what we should call moral obligations.
Many such restrictions exist among savage tribes to-day, and to these we
must turn for examples of their character. We, for instance, look upon
theft and lying as immoral practices, but such is not the case with
savages generally, most of whom will steal if the opportunity offers,
while they will lie in so transparent and useless a manner as to
indicate that they see nothing wrong in this practice. And yet the
aborigines of India, many of whom are very immoral according to our
standard, are often strongly averse to untruthfulness. "A true Gond,"
says Mr. Grant, "will commit a murder, but he will not tell a lie." It
is well known that truthfulness was one of the chief virtues of the
ancient Persians, a virtue that was accompanied by much which we would
call immoral. The Hindoo devotee is exceedingly tender of the lives of
animals, while he is often callous to human suffering. Disregard of
human suffering, indeed, showed itself strongly through all the past
ages, men being slaughtered with as little compunction as if they were
so many wild beasts, while frightful tortures were inflicted with an
extraordinary absence of humane feeling. And these excesses were
committed by persons who in the ordinary affairs of life were frequently
tender in feeling and conscientious in action.

In truth, moral development from this point of view has always shown a
one-sidedness that goes far to discredit the doctrine of intuitive
conceptions of right and wrong. The indicatio