ch occupy themselves with things
human and divine. Here also the philosophy of jurisprudence, of history,
of religion, etc., consisted in this, that in place of the true
interconnection of events, one originating in the mind of the
philosopher was substituted; that history, in its totality as in its
parts, was comprehended as the gradual realization of ideas, but, of
course, always of the pet idea of the philosopher himself.

History worked up to now, unconsciously but necessarily, towards a
certain predetermined, fixed, ideal goal, as for example in the case of
Hegel, towards the realization of his Absolute Idea, and the unalterable
trend towards this Absolute Idea constituted the inward connection of
historic facts. In the place of the real, and up to this time unknown,
interrelation, man set a new mysterious destiny, unconscious or
gradually coming into consciousness. It was necessary in this case,
therefore, just as in the realm of nature, to set aside these artificial
interrelations by the discovery of the real, a task which finally
culminated in the discovery of the universal laws of progress, which
established themselves as the dominating ones in the history of human
society.

The history of the growth of society appears, however, in one respect
entirely different from that of nature. In nature are to be found as far
as we leave the reaction of man upon nature out of sight--mere
unconscious blind agents which act one upon another, and in their
interplay the universal law realizes itself. From all that happens,
whether from the innumerable apparent accidents which appear upon the
surface, or from the final results flowing from these accidental
occurrences, nothing occurs as a desired conscious end. On the contrary,
in the history of society the mere actors are all endowed with
consciousness; they are agents imbued with deliberation or passion, men
working towards an appointed end; nothing appears without an intentional
purpose, without an end desired. But this distinction, important as it
is for historical examination, particularly of single epochs and events,
can make no difference to the fact that the course of history is
governed by inner universal laws. Here also, in spite of the wished for
aims of all the separate individuals, accident for the most part is
apparent on the surface. That which is willed but rarely happens. In the
majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and interfere with
each ot