it was further
proposed not only to clothe this national legislature with original
powers of legislation in all cases to which the several states are
incompetent, but also to allow it to set aside at discretion such state
laws as it might deem unconstitutional. It is interesting to find
Madison, whose Federalism afterward came to be so moderate, now
appearing as the earnest defender of this extreme provision, so
incompatible with state rights. But in Madison's mind at this moment, in
the actual presence of the anarchy of the confederation, the only
alternative which seemed to present itself was that of armed coercion.
"A negative on state laws," he said, "is the mildest expedient that can
be devised for enforcing a national decree. Should no such precaution be
engrafted, the only remedy would be coercion. The negative would render
the use of force unnecessary. This prerogative of the general government
is the great pervading principle that must control the centrifugal
tendency of the states, which, without it, will continually fly out of
their proper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony of the political
system." But these views were not destined to find favour with the
convention, which finally left the matter to be much more satisfactorily
adjusted through the medium of the federal judiciary.
Such were the fundamental provisions of the Virginia plan with regard to
the national legislature. To carry out the laws, it was proposed that
there should be a national executive, to be chosen by the national
legislature for a short term, and ineligible a second time. Whether the
executive power should be invested in a single person or in several was
not specified. As will be seen hereafter, this was regarded as an
extremely delicate point, with which it was thought best not to
embarrass the Virginia plan at the outset. Passing lightly over this, it
was urged that, in order to complete the action of the government upon
individuals, there must be a national judiciary to determine cases
arising under the Constitution, cases in admiralty, and cases in which
different states or their citizens appear as parties. The judges were to
be chosen by the national legislature, to hold office during good
behaviour.
[Sidenote: First reception of the Virginia plan.]
Such, in its main outlines, was the plan which Randolph laid before the
convention, in the name of the Virginia delegation. An audacious scheme!
exclaimed some of the dele
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