d not have handled logic as Aristotle, nor
Aristotle have criticized poets as Plato; yet reasoning and poetry are
subject to scientific rules.

It is a great point then to enlarge the range of studies which a
University professes, even for the sake of the students; and, though they
cannot pursue every subject which is open to them, they will be the
gainers by living among those and under those who represent the whole
circle. This I conceive to be the advantage of a seat of universal
learning, considered as a place of education. An assemblage of learned
men, zealous for their own sciences, and rivals of each other, are
brought, by familiar intercourse and for the sake of intellectual peace,
to adjust together the claims and relations of their respective subjects
of investigation. They learn to respect, to consult, to aid each other.
Thus is created a pure and clear atmosphere of thought, which the student
also breathes, though in his own case he only pursues a few sciences out
of the multitude. He profits by an intellectual tradition, which is
independent of particular teachers, which guides him in his choice of
subjects, and duly interprets for him those which he chooses. He
apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it
rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points
and its little, as he otherwise cannot apprehend them. Hence it is that
his education is called "Liberal." A habit of mind is formed which lasts
through life, of which the attributes are, freedom, equitableness,
calmness, moderation, and wisdom; or what in a former Discourse I have
ventured to call a philosophical habit. This then I would assign as the
special fruit of the education furnished at a University, as contrasted
with other places of teaching or modes of teaching. This is the main
purpose of a University in its treatment of its students.

And now the question is asked me, What is the _use_ of it? and my answer
will constitute the main subject of the Discourses which are to follow.

2.

Cautious and practical thinkers, I say, will ask of me, what, after all,
is the gain of this Philosophy, of which I make such account, and from
which I promise so much. Even supposing it to enable us to exercise the
degree of trust exactly due to every science respectively, and to estimate
precisely the value of every truth which is anywhere to be found, how are
we better for this master view of things, wh