of those
possibilities which will appeal differently to different minds.

[10] _Types of Ethical Theory_, vol. ii., pp. 31 ff.

[11] _Spinoza_, p. 195.

[12] Cp. _Pantheism_, p. 74.

[13] _Spinoza_, p. 196.

[14] In _Mind_, October, 1893; quoted in Professor Upton's invaluable
Hibbert Lectures on _The Bases of Religious Belief_, p. 293, n.

[15] It may be interesting to quote a recent popular statement of the
neo-Hegelian position in regard to this question: "The feeling that we
are free is true in this sense, that the cause of a moral deed is a
motive within us, and not some power outside us. But this motive moves
us because of what we are, because of our characters, and the character
is the product of inherited instincts, appetites and passions, modified
by controlling ideas which have been acquired since our birth. Mr.
Blatchford is so far right in his book, _Not Guilty_. The inward and
outward conditions of a man's life, of course, _make him what he is
inevitably_. We choose, but our choice is governed by all our past, and
by present circumstances. . . We have our ancestors rolled up in us. A
man is the last result of the universe. All is law. All is inevitable
by the laws of life:" (The Rev. G. T. Sadler, B.A., LL.B., in the
_Clarion_, June 11th, 1909). That, of course, is not liberty at all; and
the logical honours appear to rest with Mr. Blatchford, who, arguing on
the same assumptions, declares sin to be a meaningless term, seeing that
"man is not responsible for his nature, nor for the acts prompted by that
nature."

[16] _System of Logic_, vol. ii., p. 412 (third edition).

{171}

CHAPTER X

MORALITY AS A RELIGION

That minimising or denial of moral evil with which we dealt in the
preceding pages, is common to, and follows as the corollary from, all
systems in which the personality and transcendence of God are either
explicitly denied or virtually ignored. Monism, that is to
say,--whether of the idealistic or the materialistic variety, whether
pantheist or atheist in complexion--finds its ethical counterpart in
Determinism.

There are, however, in our pathetically restless age a number--probably
a growing number--of serious men and women who attack the problem from
the opposite end. Weary of speculation, and leaning on the whole to
the side of negation rather than affirmation in matters of theology,
they say that one thing at any rate is left, a certainty of which no
one can