u may take
it from me that this does not admit of dispute....

At any rate we are in agreement as to Natural Selection being capable of
explaining evolution "from amoeba to man."

It is generally admitted that that is a mechanical or scientific
explanation. That is to say, it invokes nothing but intelligible actions
and causes.

De Vries, however, asserts that the Darwinian theory is _not_ scientific
at all, and that is of course a position he has a right to take up.

But if we admit that it is scientific, then we are precluded from
admitting a "directive power."

This was von Baer's position, also that of Kant and of Weismann.

But von Baer remarks that the naturalist is not precluded from asking
"whether the _totality_ of details leads him to a general and final
basis of intentional design." I have no objection to this, and offer it
as an olive-branch which you can throw to your howling and sneering
critics.

As to "structures organised to serve certain definite purposes," surely
they offer no more difficulty as regards "scientific" explanation than
the apparatus by which an orchid is fertilised.

We can work back to the amoeba to find ourselves face to face with a
scarcely organised mass of protoplasm. And then we find ourselves face
to face with a problem which will, perhaps, for ever remain insoluble
scientifically. But as for that, so is the primeval material of which it
(protoplasm) is composed. "Matter" itself is evaporating, for it is
being resolved by physical research into something which is intangible.

We cannot form the slightest idea how protoplasm came into existence.
It is impossible to regard it as a mere substance. It is a mechanism.
Although the chemist may hope to make eventually all the substances
which protoplasm fabricates, and will probably do so, he can only build
them up by the most complicated processes. Protoplasm appears to be able
to manufacture them straight off in a way of which the chemist cannot
form the slightest conception. This is one aspect of the mystery of
_life_. Herbert Spencer's definition tells one nothing.

Science can only explain nature as it reveals itself to the senses in
terms of consciousness. The explanation may be all wrong in the eyes of
omniscience. All one can say is that it is a practical working basis,
and is good enough for mundane purposes. But if I am asked if I can
solve the riddle of the Universe I can only answer, No. Brunetiere then
retorts th