glacis. Bazaine massed his
reserves on the plateau of Plappeville and to the rear of his left wing;
but this cardinal fault in his dispositions--due to his haunting fear of
being cut off from Metz--was long hidden by the woods and slopes in the
rear of his centre. The position here and on the French left was very
strong, and at several parts so far concealed the troops that up to 11
A.M. the advancing Germans were in doubt whether the French would not
seek to break away towards the north-west. That so great an army would
remain merely on the defensive, a course so repugnant to the ardour of
the French nature and the traditions of their army, entered into the
thoughts of few.

Yet such was the case. The solution of the riddle is to be found in
Bazaine's despatch of August 17 to the Minister of War: "We are going to
put forth every effort to make good our supplies of all kinds in order
to resume our march in two days if that is possible[41]." That the army
was badly hampered by lack of stores is certain; but to postpone even
for a single day the march to Verdun by the northern road--that by way
of Briey--was fatal. Possibly, however, he hoped to deal the Germans so
serious a blow, if they attacked him on the 18th, as to lighten the
heavy task of cutting his way out on the 19th.

[Footnote 41: Bazaine, _Rapport sommaire, etc._ The sentence quoted
above is decisive. The defence which Bazaine and his few defenders later
on put forward, as well as the attacks of his foes, are of course mixed
up with theories evolved _after_ the event.]

If so, he nearly succeeded. The Germans were quite taken aback by the
extent and strength of his lines. Their intention was to outflank his
right wing, which was believed to stretch no further north than
Amanvillers; but the rather premature advance of Manstein's 9th corps
soon drew a deadly fire from that village and the heights on either
side, which crushed the artillery of that corps. Soon the Prussian
Guards and the 12th corps began to suffer from the fire poured in from
the trenches that crowned the hill. On the German right, General
Steinmetz, instead of waiting for the hoped-for flank attack on the
north to take effect, sent the columns of the First Army to almost
certain death in the defile in front of Gravelotte, and he persisted in
these costly efforts even when the strength of the French position on
that side was patent to all. For this the tough old soldier met with
severe cens