the Tsar's telegram of July 29 to the
Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized.
All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow
Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).]

[Footnote 554: Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.]

[Footnote 555: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper,
Nos. 91-97, 161. _J'accuse_ (III. A) goes too far in accusing Austria of
consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished
on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she
did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the
gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready;
Germany was.]

This was the first of Grey's actions which betokened tension with
Germany. Up to the 28th his efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to
be crowned with success. On July 20, that is three days before Austria
precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government to seek to
moderate her demands on Servia. The day after the Austrian Note he urged
a Conference between France and England on one side and Germany and
Italy on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective
Allies, Russia and Austria. It was Germany and Austria who negatived
this by their acts of the 28th. Still Grey worked for peace, with the
approval of Russia, and, on July 30 to August 1, of Austria. But on July
31 and August 1 occurred events which frustrated these efforts. On July
31 the Berlin Government, hearing of the complete mobilisation by Russia
(a retort to the similar proceeding of Austria a few hours earlier),
sent a stiff demand to Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours;
also to Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would remain
neutral in case of a Russo-German War.

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to demobilise, without
requiring the same measure from Austria, was manifestly unjust. Russia
could not have assented without occupying an inferior position to
Austria. If Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the same
action for each of the disputants. Further, while blaming the Russians
for mobilising, she herself had taken all the preliminary steps,
including what is called _Kriegsgefahr_, which made her army far better
prepared for war than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in
view of its comparatively undeveloped railway system. Again, if the
Kaiser wished