s himself able
to maintain the dependence of man upon God without destroying morality.
He regards man's impulses not as blind instincts, but as falling
_within_ his rational nature, and constituting the forms of its
activity. He recognizes the distinction between a mere impulse, in the
sense of a tendency to act, which is directed by a foreign power, and an
impulse informed, that is, directed by reason. According to this view,
it is reason which at once gives man the independence of foreign
authority, which is implied in morality, and constitutes that affinity
between man and God, which is implied by religion. No doubt, the impulse
to know, like the impulse to love, was put into man: his whole nature is
a gift, and he is therefore, in this sense, completely dependent upon
God--"God's all, man's nought." But, on the other hand, it _is_ a
rational nature which has been put into him, and not an irrational
impulse. Or, rather, the impulse that constitutes his life as man, is
the self-evolving activity of reason.

"Who speaks of man, then, must not sever
Man's very elements from man."[A]

[Footnote A: _Christmas-Eve_.]

However the rational nature of man has come to be, whether by emanation
or creation, it necessarily brings freedom with it, and all its risks
and possibilities. It is of the very essence of reason that it should
find its law within itself.

"God's all, man's nought:
But also, God, whose pleasure brought
Man into being, stands away
As it were a hand-breadth off, to give
Room for the newly-made to live,
And look at Him from a place apart,
And use his gifts of brain and heart,
Given, indeed, but to keep for ever."[A]

[Footnote A: _Christmas-Eve_.]

Thus, while insisting on the absolute priority of God, and the original
receptivity of man; while recognizing that love, reason, and every inner
power and outer opportunity are lent to man, Browning does not forget
what these powers are. Man can only act as man; he must obey his nature,
as the stock or stone or plant obeys its nature. But to act as man is to
act freely, and man's nature is not that of a stock or stone. He is
rational, and cannot but be rational. Hence he can neither be ruled, as
dead matter is ruled, by natural law; nor live, like a bird, the life of
innocent impulse or instinct. He is placed, from the very first, on "the
table land whence life upsprings aspiring to be immortality." He is a
spirit,--responsible b