felt, and are now become the
subject of a new liking or dislike.' What this 'moral sense' approves
is benevolence, and when its approval has been acted upon, by
subjecting the selfish affections, 'virtue' is attained.]

[Footnote 22: It is instructive to compare Mandeville's _a priori_
guesses with, the results of Mr. Maine's historical investigation into
the condition of early societies. The evidence shows that society
originated in the family system. Mandeville conjectured that solitary
families would never attain to government; but Mr. Maine considers that
there was a complete despotic government in single families. 'They have
neither assemblies for consultation nor _themistes_, but every one
exercises jurisdiction over his wives and children, and they pay no
regard to one another.' The next stage is the rise of _gentes_ and
tribes, which took place probably when a family held together instead
of separating on the death of the patriarch. The features of this state
were chieftainship and _themistes_, that is, government not by laws,
but by _ex post facto_ decisions upon cases as they arose. This
gradually developed into customary law, which was in its turn
superseded, on the invention of writing, by written codes. Maine's
Ancient Law, Chap. V.]

[Footnote 23: It is perhaps worth while to quote a sentence or two,
giving the author's opinion on the theory of the Moral Sense. 'Against
every account of the principle of approbation, which makes it depend
upon a peculiar sentiment, distinct from every other, I would object,
that it is strange that this sentiment, which Providence undoubtedly
intended to be the governing principle of human nature, should,
hitherto have been so little taken notice of, as not to have got a name
in any language. The word Moral Sense is of very late formation, and
cannot yet be considered as making part of the English tongue. The word
approbation has but within these few years been appropriated to denote
peculiarly anything of this kind. In propriety of language we approve
of whatever is entirely to our satisfaction--of the form of a building,
of the contrivance of a machine, of the flavour of a dish of meat. The
word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which
we approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of
some such faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having
acted agreeably or contrary to its directions. When love, hatred, joy,