resent a "burning question." The question of the tariff, however,
remains to-day as a "burning question," but it is no longer argued on
grounds of constitutional law, but on grounds of political economy.
Hamilton's construction of the Elastic Clause has to this extent
prevailed, and mainly for the reason that a liberal construction of that
clause was needed in order to give the national government enough power
to restrict the spread of slavery and suppress the great rebellion of
which slavery was the exciting cause.

[Sidenote: Civil service reform.]
Another political question, more important, if possible, than that of
the Tariff, is to-day the question of the reform of the Civil Service;
but it is not avowedly made a party question. Twenty years ago both
parties laughed at it; now both try to treat it with a show of respect
and to render unto it lip-homage; and the control of the immediate
political future probably lies with the party which treats it most
seriously. It is a question that was not distinctly foreseen in the days
of Hamilton and Jefferson, when the Constitution was made and adopted;
otherwise, one is inclined to believe, the framers of the Constitution
would have had something to say about it. The question as to the Civil
Service arises from the fact that the president has the power of
appointing a vast number of petty officials, chiefly postmasters and
officials concerned with the collection of the federal revenue. Such
officials have properly nothing to do with politics; they are simply the
agents or clerks or servants of the national government in conducting
its business; and if the business of the national government is to be
managed on such ordinary principles of prudence as prevail in the
management of private business, such servants ought to be selected for
personal merit and retained for life or during good behaviour. It did
not occur to our earlier presidents to regard the management of the
public business in any other light than this.

[Sidenote: Origin of the "spoils system."]
But as early as the beginning of the present century a vicious system
was growing up in New York and Pennsylvania. In those states the
appointive offices came to be used as bribes or as rewards for partisan
services. By securing votes for a successful candidate, a man with
little in his pocket and nothing in particular to do could obtain some
office with a comfortable salary. It would be given him as a reward, and
some