He was stirred to burning wrath
by what seemed to him an intent to give aid and comfort to the
rebellion, and meant to punish such conduct without stopping to ask
what complications might come of it.

I had found it desirable to form a judgment of my own with reference
to the extent or limitation of military authority in the actual
circumstances, and I quote the form in which I then cast it, so that
I may not seem to be giving opinions formed after my own military
duties were ended. I concluded, "First: That martial law operates
either by reason of its proclamation by competent authority, or _ex
necessitate rei_ in the immediate theatre of military operations.
Second; That when the struggle is in the nature of a revolution, and
so long as the attempted revolution is in active progress, no
definite limits can be given to the 'theatre of operations,' but the
administration must be regarded as possessing a limited
discretionary power in the use of martial law." As to the practical
application of this power, "the presumptions are always in favor of
the established civil law of the land, whenever and wherever it has
a reasonable chance of unobstructed operation. In a State or portion
of the country not the theatre of actual fighting, and where the
civil courts are actually organized and working, there must be some
strong reason for sending criminals or State prisoners before a
military tribunal; such as that the government had reason to believe
that a conspiracy was so powerful as to make an actual present
danger of its overthrowing the loyal governments in some of the
States before the civil courts could act in the ordinary process of
business. In such a case, the arrest and admission to bail of the
conspirators might be only the signal for their adherents to seize
the reins of civil power, overthrow the courts, and consummate a
revolution. The quick and summary action of military power would
then be the only thing which could avert the danger. The
justification of the use of a military tribunal depends on the
existence of 'probable cause' for believing the public danger to be
great."

I see no reason to change the form of stating the principle I then
adopted. The limitations given it seem sufficient to secure proper
caution in applying it, and will show that I thought then, as I do
now, that the administration ought to have laid down rules by which
the commandants of military departments could be guided, and which
woul