ogen tubes for its conveyance.

Another drawback is the large tract of ground required for an
aerodrome, and the big airship needs a large number of highly-trained
personnel to handle it.

A further point always, raised when the policy of developing the
airship was mooted is its vulnerability. It cannot be denied that it
presents a large target to artillery or to the aeroplane attacking it,
and owing to the highly inflammable nature of hydrogen when mixed with
air there can be no escape if the gas containers are pierced by
incendiary bullets or shells.

Another contributing factor to the slow development of the airship was
the lack of private enterprise. Rivalry existed between private firms
for aeroplane contracts which consequently produced improvements in
design; airships could not be produced in this way owing to the high
initial cost, and if the resulting ships ended in failure, as many were
bound to do, there would be no return for a large outlay of capital.
The only way by which private firms could be encouraged to embark on
airship building was by subsidies from the Government, and at this time
the prevalent idea of the doubtful value of the airship was too strong
for money to be voted for this purpose.

To strengthen this argument no demand had either been made from those
in command of the Fleet or from commanders of our Armies for airships
to act as auxiliaries to our forces.

The disasters experienced by all early airships and most particularly
by the Zeppelins were always seized upon by those who desired to
convince the country what unstable craft they were, and however safe in
the air they might be were always liable to be wrecked when landing in
anything but fine weather. Those who might have sunk their money in
airship building thereupon patted themselves upon the back and rejoiced
that they had been so far-seeing as to avoid being engaged upon such a
profitless industry.

Finally, all in authority were agreed to adopt the policy of letting
other countries buy their experience and to profit from it at a later
date. Had the war been postponed for another twenty years all might
have been well, and we should have reaped the benefit, but most
calamitously for ourselves it arrived when we were utterly unprepared,
and having, as we repeat, only three airships of any military value.

With these three ships, Astra-Torres (No. 3), Parseval (No. 4) and
Beta, the Navy did all that was possible. At the ve