uite analogous to, if indeed it be
not the same law as that according to which it appreciates the interests
of others" (p. 71). This bit of "subjective analysis" (p. 60), a
procedure rather scornfully condemned as "subjective quibbling" on the
following page, must be counted a fortunate lapse. It could be bettered,
I think, in only one point. Must the future self "of course" and
"always" get license to live by meeting the standards of the present
self? Has the present self no modesty, no curiosity, no "sense of
humor"? If it is so stupidly hard and fast, how can a self new and
qualitatively different ever get upon its feet in a man? In some men no
such thing can happen--but must it be in all men impossible and
impossible "of course"? And what of the other self? Carver has not
applied the "methods of subjective analysis" to _change_ from self _to_
self or from interest in self _to_ interest in others. The present tense
of formal logic governs fundamentally throughout the whole account.

If this essay were a volume I should try to consider, from the point of
view of constructive intelligence, the explanation of interest as due to
the undervaluation of future goods.

[55] Fite, _Introductory Study of Ethics_, pp. 3-8.

[56] Dewey and Tufts, _Ethics_, pp. 205-11.

[57] The term "egocentric predicament" (cf. R. B. Perry: _Present
Philosophical Tendencies_, p. 129 ff.) has had, for a philosophic term,
a remarkable literary success. But at best it conveys a partial view of
the situation it purports to describe. The "egocentricity" of our
experience, viewed in its relation to action, seems, rightly considered,
less a "predicament" than an opportunity, a responsibility and an
immunity. For in relation to _action_, it means (1) that an objective
complex situation has become, in various of its aspects, a matter of my
cognizance in terms significant to me. That so many of its aspects have
come into relations of conflict or reenforcement significant _for me_ is
_my_ opportunity for reconstructive effort if I choose to avail myself
of it. Because, again, I am thus "on hand myself" (_op. cit._, p. 129)
and am thus able to "report" upon the situation, I am (2) responsible,
in the measure of my advantages, for the adequacy of my performance. And
finally (3) I cannot be held to account for failure to reckon with such
aspects of the situation as I cannot get hold of in the guise of "ideas,
objects of knowledge or experiences" (_Ibid._)