y to the effect of
crowding population, and therefore belongs to society as a whole rather
than to the individual possessing it. In fact, if the state were to
consume the entire economic rent, it would take only, it is said, what
already belongs to the community. Other supposed advantages of the single
tax system are the reduced expense of assessment and collection, together
with incidental effects in promoting production by removing burdens from
capital, in preventing the holding of land unproductive, possibly in
equalizing wealth and diminishing greed for landed property, while the
poorer, cheaper agricultural lands, having no rent value, would be
relieved of all burden. These are essentially the views maintained by the
followers of Henry George, the leading champion of such taxation. It is
claimed, further, that the poor in crowded cities would be better housed,
since buildings would bear no taxation, and holders of city lots would
make them productive through construction of buildings without adding to
their burden of taxation. It is claimed also that such taxation would be
finally distributed, and fairly distributed, among all the consumers of
products affected by land possession, as well as all even indirectly
making use of the land. Since food and shelter are universal, all would
contribute, so far as they are self-dependent, according to food consumed
and space occupied.

These statements are somewhat inconsistent with each other. If rent is of
such a nature, as assumed at the beginning of the argument, that it cannot
directly affect all values because it depends upon those values for its
existence, a tax levied upon it cannot be distributed but rests wholly
upon the landholder. If, on the other hand, a tax on land is distributed
among all consumers of its products, there is no economic rent, but the
burden rests upon the consumers alone, according to the amount consumed,
subjecting this tax to the objection against all indirect taxes that the
poor bear the heavier burden.

It is evident, too, that such a tax must bear heavily upon the unthrifty.
The valuation of farms must be made by an expert judge of what farms
similarly situated ought to produce. A farm valued at $500 annual rent
might, under thrifty management, produce twice as much as under unthrifty
management. The tax, under thrifty management, could be easily paid; under
unthrifty management, it would ruin the manager. This certainly does not
levy the