| papers."
It would be unjust to cast upon the Electoral Commission the blame of
all the wrong that has been practised in this presidential count. The
Commission was but a council of advice, which Congress might have taken
or not, as it pleased, the only condition being that, in order to reject
it, both Houses must have agreed. The responsibility of the final
decision lay, after all, upon Congress, or rather, upon the Senate,
which voted throughout to follow the Commission.
* * * * *
The facts thus briefly recited present certain questions--moral,
political, and legal--which cannot be considered too soon for our good
repute and our self-respect.
THE MORAL QUESTION.
Whatever differences of opinion there may be about the political and
legal questions involved, there can be none about the moral. The
presidential office is the gift of the people of the several States, of
their own free-will, expressed according to the laws. A falsification of
that will is an offense against the State where it is committed, and
against all the States. If the falsification is beyond the reach of the
law, it is not beyond the reach of the conscience. A robbery is none the
less a robbery because it is beyond the range of vision or the arm of
justice. If the possessor of an estate has entered through the forgery
of a record or the spoliation of a will, which although believed by
every neighbor is beyond judicial proof, all the world pronounces his
possession fraudulent, even though he scatters his wealth in charities
and gathers many companions around his luxurious table. The example is
corrupting, but it is against the eternal law of justice that the act
should be respected or the actors continue forever to prosper.
It is no answer to these observations to say that frauds have been
practised on the other side. Unhappily there is too much reason to
believe that neither party is free from practices which are at once a
scourge and a dishonor. Neither has the disgraceful monopoly of such
practices, whichever may have the bad preeminence. But this is certain:
one wrong neither justifies nor palliates another.
There is no set-off known to the moral law. Because A has defrauded B,
that is no reason why B should defraud A. If it were so, society would
go on forever in a compound ratio of crime. The first breach of the law
would furnish excuse for the second, and their progeny wo
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