ould be one true religion among the multitude,
and but one, only the devotees of that single faith can be on the safe
side. But as no one knows _which_ is the only true religion, it follows,
according to the law of probabilities, that the odds are greatly against
any particular religion being the right one. The Christian therefore
would have one chance of being right, and nine hundred and ninety-nine
chances of being wrong. He has thus one chance in a thousand above the
Atheist.

But, on the other hand, if all religions but one are certainly wrong,
what is the chance of a single one being certainly right? Does not
the Christian's slight percentage of safety fade into something quite
inappreciable in the light of this question? And is what is left--if
_anything_ is left--an adequate price for the abnegation of manhood?
Would it tempt an honest man, with a sense of human dignity, to play
fast and loose with his intellect, and accept a creed because it appeals
to his selfish hopes and fears? Could such a slender chance of profit in
the next life compensate for slavery in this life?

If belief is the safe side, the proper course is to believe
_everything_. And it is useless to cry that this is impossible. Faith
enables men to believe against reason, and one act of credulity is
little easier than a thousand. He whose creed is determined by his fears
should give free scope to such emotions. If they are his guides let him
follow them. Why should he argue when argument may mislead? Why should
he stumble at trifles when he has surmounted the first great obstacle
to credulity? Let him believe all the religions of the world at once.
He can do this as easily as he can believe in the Trinity. And having
embraced all, he may rest satisfied that if there be a true religion he
undoubtedly possesses it.

We do not suppose, however, that this reasoning will have any effect
on Christians, Buddhists, Brahmins, Mohammedans, or Jews. But that very
fact shows the hollow character of the argument from which we started.
When the Christian talks about the safe side he is only displaying the
weakness of his faith, and appealing to timidity when he has no further
appeal to reason.

The argument of "the safe side" would have no pertinency, even with the
imbecile, if man were immortal. It seeks advantage from the fact that
every man must die. It tries to paralyse reason with the clutch of fear.

How frequent is the superstitionist's remark, "Wa