conditions that confronted the Russian commander. Erzerum is situated
on a plateau some 6,000 feet above sea level, and the key forts had
been placed on high ground commanding the surrounding country. However
well the Russian transport department had done its work, the Russian
supply of heavy artillery could not have been overwhelming in the
sense that heavy guns were overwhelming on other fronts. There could,
therefore, have been no condition of affairs where the infantry was
called upon simply to occupy positions previously shattered by
gunfire. Indeed, the best opinions agree that little or no real damage
was done by the artillery to the Erzerum forts and that the infantry
had to advance against practically intact defenses. Yet, after five
days of fierce assault, the hardy Siberian troops of General
Judenich's army carried nine of the outlying forts and forced the
evacuation of the entire fortress.

There can be but one explanation of this astonishing result. It is
hardly possible for any troops to take a position like Erzerum by
direct assault. The fortress successfully resisted all Russian
attempts to capture it in the Russo-Turkish War, although then far
less strong than in 1916. Some foreign military critics have tried to
explain the puzzling facts by claiming that the well-known bravery
and tenacity of the Turk on defense, shown all through his history and
never more evident than in the Gallipoli campaign, was, for some
unknown reason, totally lacking at Erzerum. Such claims, however, do
not hold water.

Erzerum was evacuated simply because of a menace to the Turkish lines
of communication and the danger of isolation. However well provisioned
the fortress might have been--and its stores were vast, for it was the
chief supply and provisioning center for the whole Turkish military
organization in Asia Minor--it could not hope to withstand an
indefinite siege. The Turkish high command would not view with
equanimity the bottling up of close upon 200,000 of its first-line
troops. With the example of Przemysl, and Metz in 1870 in its mind, it
decided upon a, perhaps, temporary abandonment of the position
immediately it became apparent that the Russian advance from the
northeast and southeast could not be successfully opposed by the
troops available.

Furthermore, the defense of the fortress was weakened by the condition
of the country over which the Turkish army had to retreat in any
retirement from Erzerum. It is