ress, vesting him with
that authority.

To me it appears absolutely necessary, that this power should be
vested in the Financier to enable him to remedy and prevent public
abuses; and the _extent_ should be measured by the _necessity_ and the
_use_. As to myself, I am far from desiring power for the sake of
power. Indeed I think it is generally more dangerous to the possessor
than to the objects of it. Consequently I cannot have a wish to extend
it beyond the necessity and utility mentioned.

The whole business of finance may be described in two short but
comprehensive sentences, if I have proper notions on the subject. _It
is to raise the public revenues, by such modes as may be most easy and
most equal to the people; and to expend them in the most frugal, fair,
and honest manner._ In our case the first part must ever be the
business of Congress, and the Legislatures of the respective States;
because the powers of taxation cannot be delegated. The second I take
to be the most essential part of the duty of the Superintendent of
Finance. He must ever have it in view to reduce the expenditures as
nearly as possible to what in justice and in reason they ought to be;
and to do this, he must be vested with power to dismiss from
employment those officers he shall find unnecessary, unequal to their
stations, inattentive to their duty, or dishonest in the exercise of
it.

In a monarchy this power need not be officially vested in a Minister,
because he can have constant intercourse with the Sovereign, and by
that means he is in the daily exercise of it. Where the sovereignty is
vested in a public body of men, such an intercourse is impracticable;
and I am persuaded that a Minister who would venture to execute the
duties of his office with vigor, without possessing uncontrolled the
power of dismission, would in a few months put it out of his power to
proceed in his business, and Congress would have full employment to
hear and determine between him and suspended officers. On the
contrary, if a dismissed officer can have no appeal but to the laws of
the land, Congress will not be troubled, business may be conducted
with decision, and the very knowledge that such a power exists, will
have a tendency to prevent the frequent exercise of it, after the
first reforms are effected.

I have been told, that some gentlemen considered the expressions in my
letter to Congress on this subject so general as that they might be
construed to