ccupied by the men who
made the first charge they could begin their own charge. As barrages are
intermittent, one commander had his men lie down behind one until it had
ceased. Again, after waiting on another for a while he decided that he
might be late in keeping his engagement in Courcelette and gave the
order to go through, which, as one soldier said, "we did in a
hundred-yard dash sprinting a double quick--good reason why!" When the
fresh wave passed the fellows in the new line the winners of the first
objective called, "Go to it!" "You'll do it!" "Hurrah for Canada!" and
added touches of characteristic dry humor which shell fire makes a
little drier, such as a request to engage seats for the theatre at
Courcelette that evening.
Consider that these battalions which were to take Courcelette had to
march about two miles under shell fire, part of the way over ground
that was spongy earth cut by shell-craters, before they could begin
their charge and that they were undertaking an innovation in tactics,
and you have only half an understanding of their task. Their officers
were men out of civil life in every kind of occupation, learning their
war in the Ypres salient stalemate, and now they were to have the
severest possible test in directing their units in an advance.
There had been no time to lay out pattern plans for each company's
course in this second rush according to map details, which is so
important against modern defenses. The officers did not know where
machine guns were hidden; they were uncertain of the strength of the
enemy who had had all day to prepare for the onslaught on his bastions
in the village. It was pitched battle conditions against set defenses.
Under curtains of fire, with the concentration heavy at one point and
weak at another, with machine gun or sniping fire developing in some
areas, with the smoke and the noise, with trenches to cross, the
business of keeping a wave of men in line of attack for a long
distance--difficult enough in a manoeuver--was possible only when the
initiative and an understanding of the necessities of the situation
exist in the soldiers themselves. If one part of the line was not up, if
a section was being buffeted by salvos of shells, the officers had to
meet the emergency; and officers as well as men were falling, companies
being left with a single officer or with only a "non-com" in charge.
Unless a man was down he knew that his business was to "get there" and
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