extended disposition complete when orders were
received to relieve two companies of the Devons, as their battalion
was down to carry out an attack that night. Of course as luck would
have it, the companies were right up on the top of the hill, and the
only people available to relieve them were the companies which had
just come down after having done a couple of days up there. However,
there was nothing else for it, and they just had to go back, with the
promise that they would be relieved as soon as Brigade sent the troops
to replace them. During the afternoon the senior officers from the
attacking battalion came down to reconnoitre, but it was about 4 P.M.
by the time they got down, and consequently they had only time to see
their objective from one point of view which, as it happened, was a
fatal misfortune, as it left them with quite a false impression of
what their position would be when once they got their objective. There
was some discussion as to whether it should be a raid or a
consolidation. All those on the spot favoured a raid, but judging from
the map it appeared a desirable position to consolidate, and this was
finally ordered.

Almost every division made one such mistake when first operating in
this mountainous country, and this was to prove to be ours. The
objective was the hill and village of Beit-ur-el-Foka--the Upper
Bethhoron of the Bible, where the sun stood still for Joshua--which
seemed to occupy a commanding position on the old Roman road between
Beit-ur-el-Tahta and El Jib, and was marked clearly on the map. It was
also supposed to contain water, and to be desirable for that reason.
The attack was carried out by an advance up the Wadi Zait to a
position of deployment at the foot of Foka Hill itself, whence the
summit was successfully rushed. There were few casualties and a good
haul of prisoners--somewhere about 150. But it was to prove impossible
to remain there. The position itself was not sufficiently roomy for a
battalion, and no digging was possible owing to the rocky ground. It
was also too exposed from no less than three sides.

Opposite, across the Wadi Imaish, which ran east and west, roughly
N.N.E. from Foka, was the dominating ridge of Zeitun, some hundreds of
feet higher than Foka and under 1800 yards away; to the N.N.W.,
perhaps 2000 yards off, was the crest of Khirbet Kereina, fully as
high as Foka; and, as if these two dominating positions in front,
giving first-class artillery o