were along the coast, and what forces of the enemy were
likely to be encountered in landing. The fleet lay off from the shore
about a mile, and it was no small undertaking to convey the 17,000 men
on board with all their arms and equipments to the shore in small
boats over a rough sea, especially should the landing be disputed. It
was to arrange for the landing and also to map out a general plan of
campaign that the three great leaders, Shafter, Sampson and Garcia met
at Aserradores on the afternoon of June 20th as the American fleet
stood guard over the harbor of Santiago.

General Garcia was already aware of the coming of the fleet, having
received a message from Major-General Miles two weeks previous. The
letter of General Miles ran as follows:

Headquarters of the Army,
In the Field, Tampa, Fla., June 2, 1898.

Dear General:--I am very glad to have received your
officers, General Enrique Collazo and Lieut.-Col. Carlos
Hernandez, the latter of whom returns to-night with our best
wishes for your success.

It would be a very great assistance if you could have as
large a force as possible in the vicinity of the harbor of
Santiago de Cuba, and communicate any information by signals
which Colonel Hernandez will explain to you either to our
navy or to our army on its arrival, which we hope will be
before many days.

It would also assist us very much if you could drive in and
harass any Spanish troops near or in Santiago de Cuba,
threatening or attacking them at all points, and preventing,
by every means, any possible re-enforcement coming to that
garrison. While this is being done, and before the arrival
of our army, if you can seize and hold any commanding
position to the east or west of Santiago de Cuba, or both,
that would be advantageous for the use of our artillery, it
will be exceedingly gratifying to us."

To this General Garcia replied that he would "take measures at once to
carry out your (Miles') recommendation, but concentration of forces
will require some time. Roads bad and Cubans scattered. Will march
without delay." Admiral Sampson also cabled the Secretary of the Navy
that Garcia "regards his (Miles') wishes and suggestions as orders,
and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points
indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of
his expedition at