Rome.--Cineas's
plans for bribing the Roman senators.--Speech of Cineas in the Roman
senate.--Debate in the senate.--An incident of the discussion.--Appius
Claudius is brought on a bed to the senate.--Speech of Appius
Claudius.--Effect of his speech on the senate.--Cineas makes report of
his mission.--Fabricius sent to Pyrrhus.--His reception.--The elephant
concealed in the tent.--Pyrrhus makes great offers to Fabricius.--The
Roman armies advance.--The two generals.--The armies encamp in sight
of each other.--His military honors.--Story of Decius Mus.--The
vision.--Extraordinary alternative proposed.--The two consuls draw
lots.--Decius sacrifices himself.--Superstitious fears of the
soldiers.--Decius Mus.--Reply of Decius Mus to Pyrrhus.--The Romans
afraid of the elephants.--The battle.--The elephants.--War
chariots.--Doubtful victory.--Winter-quarters.--Nicias.--Pyrrhus's
physician.--His treachery.--A generous exchange of prisoners.--No
peace.

The result of the battle on the banks of the Siris, decisive and
complete as the victory was on the part of the Greeks, produced, of
course, a very profound sensation at Rome. Instead, however, of
discouraging and disheartening the Roman senate and people, it only
aroused them to fresh energy and determination. The victory was
considered as wholly due to the extraordinary military energy and
skill of Pyrrhus, and not to any superiority of the Greek troops over
those of the Romans in courage, in discipline, or in efficiency in the
field. In fact, it was a saying at Rome at the time, that it was
Laevinus that had been conquered by Pyrrhus in the battle, and not the
Romans by the Greeks. The Roman government, accordingly, began
immediately to enlist new recruits, and to make preparations for a new
campaign, more ample and complete, and on a far greater scale than
before.

Pyrrhus was much surprised when he heard these things. He had
supposed that the Romans would have been disheartened by the defeat
which they had sustained, and would now think only of proposals and
negotiations for peace. He seems to have been but very imperfectly
informed in respect to the condition of the Roman commonwealth at this
period, and to the degree of power to which it had attained. He
supposed that, after suffering so signal and decisive a defeat, the
Romans would regard themselves as conquered, and that nothing remained
to them now but to consider how they could make the best terms with
their c