to apply it.
Only I asked the question, because we must not forget that many say
it is begging the question; for, as a 'miracle' has not been exerted
on us to give us a vision of the past experience of man, or his
present experience in any part of the world we never visited, our
opponents affirm, that to say that the experience we trust to has been
and is the universal experience of man, is a clear petitio principii."

"Surely," said Fellowes, "it may be said that the general experience of
mankind has been of such a character."

"Exactly so, as a postulate from our experience, as a generalized
assumption that our experience may be taken as a specimen and criterion
of all experience. We assume that,--we do not prove it. It is just as
in any other case of induction; we say, 'Because this is true in twenty
or thirty or a hundred instances (as the case may be), which we can test,
--therefore it is generally or universally true'; we do not say, because
this is true in these instances, and because it is also generally or
universally true, therefore it is so! No; our true premise is restricted
to what alone we know from our experience and the experience of all
whose experience we can test if we please. This is our real ground on
which we are to justify our rejection of all miracles, and let us adhere
to it. As to your general experience, you see, the advocate of miracles
easily gets over that. He says, 'Why, no one pretends that miracles are
as "plenty as blackberries"; otherwise they would no longer be miracles;
these are comparatively rare events, of course; and, being rare, are
necessarily at variance with general experience'; and, for my part, I
should not know how to answer the objection."

"Well, then," said Fellowes. "let us adhere to that which is our real
ground of objection, and let us consistently apply it."

"With all my heart," said Harrington; "we agree then, that our own
uniform experience,--that of all our neighbors and friends,--in fact,
of all whose experience we can test, is a sufficient criterion of a
law of nature, and justifies us in at once rejecting as possible any
alleged fact which violates it."

"Certainly."

"For example, if it were asserted that last year that the sun never
rose on a certain day, or, rather, for twenty-four hours the rotation
of the earth ceased, we should instantly reject the story, without
examination of witnesses, or any such thing."

"No doubt of that."

"And just so