re upon the extent to which the
conformation of the coast will permit of tactical support by gun-fire and
feints. If the Naval Staff are unwilling to agree to the point or points
their colleagues most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up,
which the higher Joint Staff must adjust. It will be the duty of the Naval
Staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea risks the proposal of the
army entails, and if possible to suggest an alternative by which the risk
of naval interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a burden on
the army. Balancing these risks against those stated by the army, the
superior Staff must decide which line is to be taken, and each service then
will do its best to minimise the difficulties it has to face. Whether the
superior Staff will incline to the naval or the military view will depend
upon whether the greater danger likely to be incurred is from the sea or on
land.

Where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of operations can
be fixed in this way with much precision. But if, as usually happens, the
probable action of the enemy at sea cannot be divined with sufficient
approximation, then assuming there is serious possibility of naval
interference, the final choice within the limited area must be left to the
admiral. The practice has been to give him instructions which define in
order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to select the one
which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he considers within
reasonable risk of war. Similarly, if the danger of naval interference be
small and the local conditions ashore imperfectly known, the final choice
will be with the general, subject only to the practicable possibilities of
the landing place he would choose.

During the best period of our old wars there was seldom any difficulty in
making things work smoothly on these lines. After the first inglorious
failure at Rochefort in 1757 the practice was, where discretion of this
kind had been allowed, for the two commanders-in-chief to make a joint
coast-reconnaissance in the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the
spot.

It was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations was always
arranged thenceforth. Since the elder Pitt's time it has never been our
practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military
commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military
exigencies. The danger of possible fricti