Senate by a treaty may abrogate a pre-existing law containing
interfering provisions, as has been done heretofore (without the
right being questioned), and as we say in the very case under
consideration. I will endeavor to make myself understood by
examples; Congress has power, under the clause in question, to lay
embargoes, to pass nonintercourse, or nonimportation, or
countervailing laws, and this power they have frequently
exercised. On the other hand, if the nation against whom one of
those laws is intended to operate is made sensible of her injustice
and tenders reparation, the President and Senate have power by
treaty to restore the amicable relations between the two nations,
and the law directing otherwise, upon the ratification of the
treaty, is forthwith annulled. Again, if Congress should be of
opinion that the offending nation had not complied with their
engagements, they might by law revoke the treaty, and place the
relation between the two nations upon such footing as they
approved. Where is the collision here? I see none. This view of the
subject presents an aspect as innocent as that which is produced
when a subsequent law repeals a former one. By this interpretation
you reconcile one part of the constitution with another, giving to
each a proper effect, a result always desirable, and in rules of
construction claiming a precedence to all others. Indeed, sir, I do
not see how the power in question could have been otherwise
arranged. The power which has been assigned to Congress was
indispensable; without it we should have been at the mercy of a
foreign government, who, knowing the incompetency of Congress to
act, would have subjected our commerce to the most injurious
regulations, as was actually the case before the adoption of the
constitution, when it was managed by the States, by whom no regular
system could be established; indeed, we all know this very subject
was among the most prominent of the causes which produced the
constitution. Had this state of things continued, no nation which
could profit by a contrary course would have treated. On the other
hand, had not a power been given to some branch of the government to
treat, whatever might have been the friendly dispositions of other
powers, or however desirous to reciprocate beneficial arrangements,
they could not, without a treaty-making power lodged somewhere, be
realized.

I therefore contend, that although to Congress a power is giv