(1 Greenleaf, section 34--Note.)

Perhaps one of the best and clearest definitions of the meaning of a
"reasonable doubt" is found in an opinion given in Dr. Webster's
case by the learned and accurate Chief-Justice of Massachusetts. He
said;--

"The evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it." (Commonwealth versus
Webster, 5 Cush., 320.)

Far back in the early history of English jurisprudence we find that
it was considered a most serious abuse of the common law, "that
justices and their officers, who kill people by false judgment, be
not destroyed as other murderers, which King Alfred caused to be
done, who caused forty-four justices in one year to be hanged for
their false judgment. He hanged Freburne because he judged Harpin to
die, whereas the jury were in doubt of their verdict; for in
doubtful cases we ought rather to save than to condemn."

The spirit of the Roman law partook of the same care and caution in
the condemnation of those charged with crime. The maxim was:--

"_Satius_ _est_ _impunitum_ _relinqui_ _facinus_ _nocentis_, _quam_
_innocentem_ _damnare_."

That there may be no mistake concerning the fact that this
commission is bound as a jury by these rules, the same as juries in
civil courts, we again quote from Benet:--

"It is in the province of the court (court-martial) to decide all
questions on the admissibility of evidence. Whether there is any
evidence is a question for the court as judges, but whether the
evidence is sufficient is a question for the court as jury to
determine, and this rule applies to the admissibility of every kind
of evidence, written as well as oral." (Benet, pp. 225, 226.)

These citations may be indefinitely multiplied, for this principle
is as true in the law as any physical fact in the exact sciences.
It is not contended, indeed, that any degree of doubt must be of a
reasonable nature, so as to overset the moral evidence of guilt.
A mere possibility of innocence will not suffice, for, upon human
testimony, no case is free from possible innocence. Even the more
direct evidence of crime may be possibly mistaken. But the doubt
required by the law must be consonant with reason and of such a
nature that in analogous circumstances it would affect the action of
a reasonable cr