there had come from Murray's
barracks thirty or forty soldiers with no other arms than snowballs,
cakes of ice, oyster shells, cinders, and clubs, and attacked this
military watch in this manner, what do you suppose would have been
the feelings and reasonings of any of our householders? I confess, I
believe they would not have borne one-half of what the witnesses
have sworn the soldiers bore, till they had shot down as many as
were necessary to intimidate and disperse the rest; because the law
does not oblige us to bear insults to the danger of our lives, to
stand still with such a number of people around us, throwing such
things at us, and threatening our lives, until we are disabled to
defend ourselves.

(Foster, 274): "Where a known felony is attempted upon the person,
be it to rob or murder, here the party assaulted may repel force
with force, and even his own servant, then attendant on him, or any
other person present, may interpose for preventing mischief, and if
death ensue, the party so interposing will be justified. In this
case nature and social duty co-operate."

Hawkins, P. C., Chapter 28, Section 25, towards the end:--"Yet it
seems that a private person, _a_ _fortiori_, an officer of justice, who
happens unavoidably to kill another in endeavoring to defend himself
from or suppress dangerous rioters, may justify the fact in as much
as he only does his duty in aid of the public justice."

Section 24:--"And I can see no reason why a person, who, without
provocation, is assaulted by another, in any place whatsoever, in
such a manner as plainly shows an intent to murder him, as by
discharging a pistol, or pushing at him with a drawn sword, etc.,
may not justify killing such an assailant, as much as if he had
attempted to rob him. For is not he who attempts to murder me more
injurious than he who barely attempts to rob me? And can it be more
justifiable to fight for my goods than for my life?"

And it is not only highly agreeable to reason that a man in such
circumstances may lawfully kill another, but it seems also to be
confirmed by the general tenor of our books, which, speaking of
homicide _se_ _defendo_, suppose it done in some quarrel or affray.

(Hawkins, p. 71. section 14); "And so, perhaps, the killing of dangerous
rioters may be justified by any private persons, who cannot
otherwise suppress them or defend themselves from them, inasmuch as
every private person seems to be authorized by the la